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RN THE
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
AT RICHMOND
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS
OF AMERICA ..................... Plaintiff in error
v. Petition
MRS. D. A. KISER ................... Defendant in error
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia:
Your petitioner, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
(sometimes referred to in the record as The Union), respectfully
represents that it is aggrieved by final judgment of the Corporation
Court for the City of Staunton, rendered on the 1st day of June, 1938,
on the verdict of the jury of $1500.00 with interest thereon from the
30th day of May, 1938, in an attachment case in said Corporation
Court in which Mrs. D. A. Kiser was the plaintiff and your petitioner,
the principal defendant, and a certified copy of the record in the case
is herewith persented with this petition.
NOTE: Petitioner will be referred to as Petitioner or the Union
and Mrs. Kiser will be referred to as Mrs. Kiser or the plaintiff.
I
STATEMENT
Your petitioner is a voluntary, unincorporated association or labor
union, and its principle office is in the City of New York, State of
New York. It is without capital stock, and can be considered in
no sense as a business concern for profit or money making; and is
organized under a constitution, a copy of which appears in the record
(R. 157 et seq). Its objects and purposes are to aid and assist its
members (clothing workers) to improve their condition or employ-
ment, and to assist workers in their efforts to improve their eco-
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nomical, social and cultrual conditions and when necessary
2 to negotiate with employers for the general betterment of
workers. It is one of the largest labor unions in the United
States, and of national and international scope, and has done much for
the improvement of labor conditions in clothing industries; and one of
its chief missions is to bring about and promote more pleasant relations
between workers and employers; and that it is succeeding in this is
shown in an opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of National Labor Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Cor-
poration 301 U. S. page 23 and quoted from in the record at page 106.
In the fall of 1934, and the early part of 1935, petitioner
attempted to obtain members from among the employees of L. Grief
Bros. clothing manufacturers at their plant in Staunton, Va. ; and the
basis of this suit is an oral contract, set out in the amended petition
of Mrs. Kiser (R. page e), and in her bill of particulars, (R. page b) ;
and the only issue involved in the trial court was whether or not
petitioner is liable on the contract stated and set out in the petition
and bill of particulars; and on this simple and narrow issue, this case
was tried and decided in the court below in favor of Mrs. Kiser.
The claim of Mrs. Kiser is that she was an employee of L. Grief
Bros., at one of their plants in Staunton and that petitioner agreed
with her that if she would join the Union, and on account of so doing,
should lose her job as an employee, that petitioner would pay her the
wages or salary that she was earning at that time, and continue to pay
the same until she should obtain other employment or until such
other employment could be provided for her by petitioner; and that
she had become a member of the Union, and later, on the 5th day of
March, 1935, had lost her job because she had become a member of
the Union, and she accordingly alleged that she had sustained damages
to at least the sum of $3500.00. This appears in her amended petition
and amended bill of particulars. The amended petition and amended
bill of'particulars differs from the original only in that in the
3" originals it was stated that she lost 'her job because she had
been discharged by L. Grief Bros., because she had become a
member of the Union, and in the amended petition, she stated that
she had lost her job merely because she had joined the Union.
Some time after this proceeding had been instituted by Mrs.
Kiser, in the trial court, petitioner demurred to her petition upon the
principal ground that the contract stied on is uncertain and indefinite
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and not enforceable, and the trial court sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the proceedings upon the ground that the contract sued on
is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to permit of enforcement.
This decision of the trial Court was made on March 23, 1937;
and from this decision, a writ of error was obtained from this Court
and the case was afterwards heard by this Court at Staunton term
1937, and was decided bv this Court at the January Richmond term
in favor of Mrs. Kiser, holding that the contract sued on is not too
indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable, and is valid and enforceable
(See case of Kiser v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
S. E. 194, page 727 et seq.)
There had been no answer to the petition when the case was
heard and determined alone on the demurrer, and remanded to the
trial Court for a trial on its merits. There were other grounds of
demurrer decided, but they related merely to the character of the
proceeding and the only material issue decided by this Court related
alone to the validity of the contract sued on. And the case after being
remanded was tried on its merits in the trial Court at the May term,
1938 of the Corporation Court, and was decided adversely to petitioner
at the last of the term on June 1, 1938, as stated supra. The decision
of this court that concerns us was simply that the contract sued on
was valid and the question of the liability of petitioner on the contract
was not in issue, and therefore was not decided, but sent back to the
trial court to determine petitioner's liability. No defense on the merits
was made by petitioner until after the case had been sent back to the
trial court; and anything said by the Court in its opinion
4* re*lating to defensive matter on its merits is mere obiter
dictum, as for instance the statement in the opinion quoted
by the trial court in its opinion (R. 374).
The Constitution of petitioner as a defense to its liability was not
in issue, or even before the Court; but by fault of petitioner's attor-
neys had been referred to in their brief as if it were in issue which
must have lead the author of the opinion into a discussion of it.
The trial Court in overruling petitioner's motion to set aside the
verdict of the jury, upon the assigned grounds set out in the record
on pages 373-374, and in support of the decision in overruling the
motion, trial court delivered an opinion which appears in the record,
page 374 et seq; and at the beginning of the opinion, it is said
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"in the opinion of the Court, the defendant tried this
case on a theory utterly at variance with the principles laid
down by the Court of Appeals, when the case was before it
and was decided last winter."
What is meant by this we do not pretend to know. But we submit
that the trial court did what it claimed we did.
This court only in effect held that the contract sued on is a valid
contract if proven as laid, and sent the case back for trial on its
merits; that is to say, for Mrs. Kiser to prove her contract as laid and
for petitioner to make its defense on the merits, to determine whether
or not it is liable on the contract vith Mrs. Kiser.
The contract before this Court on demurrer is briefly and simply
stated as follows: (194 S. E. page 730 et scq).
"The contract or agreement in question promises the
plaintiff that if she joined the defendant's union and lost
her position because of such action, the Union will continue
her salary until she is again employed. Here the plaintiff
has fully complied with her part of the agreement and of
course, there can be no action against her."
That the plaintiff, Mrs. Kiser, had fully complied with her part
of the agreement is necessarily implied upon the assumption
Z. *that the contract could be proven as laid.
But the trial court, throughout the trial on the merits
apparently assumed that this court had held as a fact that Mrs. Kiser
had, on her part, fully complied with the agreement, as this court said
in its opinion (194 S. E. page 731)
"The plaintiff's agreement was to join the Union which
she did; and she should be accorded such benefits as were
promised her for this consideration."
And the Trial Court, throughout the trial, apparently took the
view that this court had passed on and held that Mrs. Kiser had fully
complied with her agreement and entitled to recover; and this position
was taken by the trial court when it is and was an admitted fact that
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she had never become a member of the union and that she had only
made application for membership.
And to sustain its position, the trial court held that it is wholly
immaterial whether Mrs. Kiser joined the Union or only made applica-
tion to join (R. 318) ; and the trial court, in its opinion (R. 376),
held and said that
"It is a mere technicality to evade responsibility to say
that she (Mrs. Kiser) did not in fact become a member of
the Union."
The claim that Mrs. Kiser did not become a member of the Union
is certainly not a mere techinicality. It is a material and substantial
claim, for it is hornbook law that the allegations and proofs must
correspond; and as said in the case of Hlorris v. IPeyloni, 148 Va. page
816 "It is elementary law that the proof must correspond with the
allegations."
One cannot bring another into court on a certain statement of
fact and then undertake to prove another. This would be unreasonable
and injust. It is said in Burke's 1H. & Pr. 3rd page 575,
"In every system of reasoning and certainly in all
modes of proceedure the allegations and proof must con-
form." And see 22 Encv. of Law and Practice (25-27.)
Petitioner did not file its answer to the merits until after the case
had been sent back for trial to the Corporation Court, and its
6* answer sets out fullh and clearly its defense *( R. page 1 ) ; and
any evidence introduced for l)etitioner had to come under the
averments in its answer; and it must be obvious to anyone who reads
the record that the defenses madle at the trial were made strictly under
its answer.
The contract sued on had to be proved as stated and laid in the
petition and bill of particulars and it was the duty of the trial court
to see that the case was tried under the )leadings and in conformity
therewith, and there could lie no recovery except on the case as made
out on the pleadings.
That Mrs. Kiser should become a member of the Union was the
controlling inducement and consideration to petitioner to enter into
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the agreement or contract. Joining the Union was the material and
controlling principle that would entitle her to recover and which she
was bound to prove and in no view taken of the case could a mere
application for membership be a substitute, for the consideration
alleged.
And it seems obvious to us that the trial Court could not hold on
principle or authority that the mere application of Mrs. Kiser for
membership was sufficient proof, and during the trial the fact that
she had not made out her case but a different case was clearly brought
to her attention.
Originally sixteen suits like the one brought by Mrs. Kiser were
brought by different persons against petition. Two of them were dis-
missed, leaving fourteen, and there is still pending on the docket in
the Corporation Court thirteen other cases to be tried. It appears that
no witness called by Mrs. Kiser was present when her contract or
agreement was made with the defendant, and no witness that she called
knew anything pertinent about it, and their testimony was hearsay
and irrelevant, and the Court allowed or admitted the testimony of a
number of the persons who have suits against petitioner of the same
character as this to be given in evidence relative to their own respective
contracts which was not competent evidence, but the Court
7* admitted it over objections and refused to strike out *such
testimony; and it is an admitted fact shown in the record that
she did not prove her agreement with petitioner, as stated in her
petition and bill of particulars.
Mrs. Kiser testified in her own behalf as to the facts that she
knew and her case is certainly no stronger than she could make it out
herself by her own evidence, and her own evidence showed that she
is not entitled to recover, and she, it appears, testified that her contract
had not been made until after she had been discharged or had lost
her job.
The Constitution of the Union was introduced in evidence and
the Court instructed the Jury that Mrs. Kiser presumedly had notice
of the provisions of the Constitution when she applied for membership
and became bound by the provisions thereof (R. 323), and it appeared
from her own testimony, that she had not sought relief under the
provisions of the Constitution and was therefore without remedy in
this case.
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Numerous instructions were given and refused, and it is claimed
by petitioner that the Court erred in giving and refusing instructions.
II
ERRORS COM PLAINEI) OF
(1) Errors in admitting and refusing to strike out the testi-
mony of John Caldwell, Rena Demastus, H. H. Lohr, J. W. Childress,
Mrs. H. H. Lohr, Mrs. J. \V. Childress, Mrs. John Caldwell, and
K ittv Arehart, as irreleva.nt and hearsay.
(2) Error in refusing to strike out testimony given relating to
the respective contracts of other plaintiffs in suits still pending against
petitioner.
(3) E rror in refusing to strike out the testimony of the plaintiff,
Mrs. Kiser.
(5) Error in refusing to strike out all of the plaintiff's evidence.
(4) Error in refusing to strike out the evidence of Miss Eavers,
and the blank affidavit filed with her evidence.
8*' (6) Errors of the Court in giving and refusing instruc-
tions.
(7) Error of the Court in refusing to set aside the verdict of
the jury (R. 373).
III
lEIrrors admitting and refusing to strike out the evidence of John Cald-
well and others considered, under errors No. 1.
The testimony of Mr. Caldwell relates alone to what he heard of
a conversation between Miss Corlette, one of the Union workers
and Mrs. Rena Demastus, one of thirteen plaintiffs in suits against
petitioner, pending in the Corporation Court, and the conversation
that he heard and that he testified about related alone to the con-
tract of Mrs. Demastus with Petitioner and upon which she founded
her suit against petitioner. The plaintiff, Mrs. Kiser, was not present
and the conversation that Mr. Caldwell heard did not relate to the
contract of Mrs. Kiser with petitioner; and the conversation that
he testified about was entirely foreign to Mrs. Kiser's case. Her
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contract with petitioner, was not even mentioned or referred to, and
this testimony was admitted over objection of petitioner and asked
to be strickened out (see certificate 12, R. 386).
Testimony of Mrs. Rena Demastus relates to talk that she had
with Mrs. Corlette and Miss Christenson in relation alone to the agree-
ment of Mrs. Demastus and petitioner. Mrs. Kiser was not present and
her agreement with petitioner was not referred to in any way.
Mrs. Demastus testified alone to the talk she had had with Miss
Corlett and Miss Christenson. Mrs. Kiser was not present and noth-
ing whatever was mentioned in the conversation about Mrs. Kiser's
agreement to them, and this testimony was admitted over objection of
petitioner and after being admitted, was asked to be strickened out.
(See certificate No. 7, R. 384.)
Mr. H. H. Lohr testified to no fact relating to Mrs. Kiser's
agreement, and testified chiefly about talks that Miss Christenson had
with his wife when trying to get her to join the Union. Mrs. Kiser
was not present nor was her agreement with petitioner even
9* re*ferred to in the talks that Mr. Lohr testified about. And
the statements that he claimed were made by Mr. Shebell were
made long after the Kiser agreement was entered into. And in refer-
ring in chief to what Mr. Shebell said (R. 35) Mr. Lohr said "that was
after they were put out of the factory. This testimony was admitted
over objections and was asked to be strickened out. (See certificate
No. 8, R. 382.)
J. W. Childress was not present when the agreement sued on
was made and he testified only to conversations between petitioner's
organizors and his wife, and knew nothing and said nothing what-
ever relating to the agreement sued on in this case. And his testimony
after being objected to and admitted, was asked to be strickened out.
(See certificate No. 10, R. 383.)
Mrs. H. H. Lohr is another plaintiff in one of the thirteen suits
pending against petitioner; and her testimony relates only to her
agreement sued on; and her testimony relates only to the talks that she
had with Miss Christenson, and not in the presence of Mrs. Kiser.
And there is nothing in her testimony relating directly to the agree-
ment and issue in this case, and her testimony admitted over objection
was asked to be strickened out (See certificate No. 10, R. 384).
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Mrs. J. NV. Childress, plaintiff in one of the said pending suits,
did not testify to anything directly relating to the agreement and issue
in this case; and the writing on the blackboard that she referred to
(R. 60) that she testified about was put there long after the agree-
rnent here sued on was made (R. 62), and in fairness, her testimony
has no material bearing on this case, and relates chiefly to the talks
of this witness with the organizors of petitioner, and only about mat-
ters that concerned witness, an dthe testimony was admitted over
objection and was asked to be strickencd out. (See certificate No. 11,
R. 385.)
10. *Mrs. John Caldwell, testified only as to what she heard
of conversations between Mrs. Demastus and Miss Corlett,
and knew and said nothing about the agreement and issue here and
the conversation that she had with Miss Christenson at Buffalo Gap
occurred long after the making of the agreement sued on and her
testimony after being admitted over objection, was asked to be strick-
encd out. (See certificate No. 12, R. No. 86.)
Mrs. Kitty Arehart, another of the thirteen plaintiffs in said
pending suits, said nothing to prove the Kiser contract and what she
said related alone to her talks with Miss Christenson, and her testi-
mony was admitted over objections and asked to be strickened out.
(See certificate No. 13, R. 388.)
Is it not obvious that the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses
for the plaintiff is entirely irrelevant to the issue in this case, and that
the same ought to have been strickened out?
IV.
Error in refusing to strike out testimony given relating to the respect-
ive contracts of other plaintiffs in suits still pending against
petitioner. (See Certificate No. 1, R. 265.)
Testimony relating alone to four of the thirteen suits pending
against petitioner, bv Mrs. Demastus, Mrs. Lohr, Mrs. Childress and
Mrs. Arehart respectively, was asked to be strickencd out. These
four suits are entirely independent suits and the contracts respectively
upon which the suits are founded are distinct and separate from the
contract here sued on and the testimoney given in relation to these
separate suits is entirely foreign to the case in issue, the instant case,
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and such evidence, we submit, is purely irrelevant and ought to have
been strickened out. In the trial court, each of the said four cases
were brought into the trial of the instant case and in effect, tried
with the instant case and clearly to the prejudice, of the pe-
11* titioner. *This proceedure was unusual and in fact, unheard
of, and contrary to the law of the land.
V.
Error in refusing to strike out the testimony of the plaintiff, Mrs.
Kiser. (See certificate No. 14, R. 389.)
It can hardly be contended with any fairness that the testimony
of the plaintiff witness conforms with or agrees with the allegations
of her pleading and bill of particulars.
The very soul and controlling principle of her agreement sued on
was that she should become a member of the Union, not merely an
applicant for membership. The very foundation and controlling in-
ducement of the agreement was that she should become a member of
the Union and being a mere applicant for membership, was and is an
entirely different matter. It was only membership that was of value
to petitioner. This Court said in the Kiser case, when before it on
demurrer, and the real issue before it was whether or not the same
contract sued on here was valid (194 S. E. at page 730).
"The defendant was seeking expansion in new fields,
and an enlarged membership was of great value and hell)
towards the accomplishment of this end."
A mere application for membership could be of no value or hel l)
towards the establishment of the union in Staunton. A Union without
permanence would be a vain thing, and to make it permanent or to
give it a substaintial footing, membership was absolutel- necessary.
Meer applications would be of no value to it.
The l)laintiff did not pretend or claim in her testimony that she
became a member of the Union, or that she lost her job because she
became a member. Her testimony shows that she had only applied for
membership-never paid any dues, or had any standing as a member
of the Union, and this is certainly true, although she alleges in her
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pleading and stated in her bill of particulars that she became a member,
and this was the foundation and basis of her claim, and she was
12: bound to prove her agreement as stated. And her case broke
down on her testimony.
What this court said and held in the case of Vassie v. Firmstonc,
134 Va. page 462, applies here:
"His statement of facts and the necessary inferences
therefrom are binding upon him. He cannot be heard to ask
that his case be made stronger than he makes it, when as
here, it depends upon facts within his own knowledge, and
as to which he has testified; and this same principle has
been again and again repeated by this Court."
There is no doubt about the fact that on the oral contract sued
on, it is necessary to state the consideration. This was done and had
to be proven as alleged.
"It is said in 4 ENCY. of P1. and Pr. 930, when it is
necessary to allege the consideration, it should be stated
truly and proved as laid."
And the trial Court seemed to recognize this in giving defend-
ant's instruction No. 2, R. 321 when it said that "the terms of the
contract must be clearly and expressly proven by the plaintiff as set
out in her petition; and if she should fail to prove this specific contract
sued on, then she is not entitled to recover anything in this case." But
strange to say, the trial Court at the same time gave plaintiff an
instruction directly in conflict in which the trial Court directed that
the cuestion as to whether the plaintiff merely agreed to join the
defendant's Union, or actually became a meml)er of the same, is
wholly immaterial in this case (R. 318). When it is perfectly apparent
that the very foundation and controlling consideration of the plaintiff's
contract as alelged by her is that she should become a member of
the Union and that she became a member, and becoming such a mem-
ber, lost her job, for which she is claiming damages. And upon this
action alone of the trial court, ought not the judgment complained of
be reversed ?
In the case of James v. Adams, 8 W. Va. page 368, where an
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oral contract as here was in question, the Court held that "Generally,
in actions upon special contracts, if any part of the contract proved
should vary, materially from that as stated in the declaration, it will be
fatal," "the contract being an entire thing." And further said and
held "It is a general rule that the contract must be stated
13*' *correctly, and if the evidence differs, materially, from the
statement, the whole foundation of the action fails, because the
contract is entire in its nature, and must be proved as laid."
We submit that there can be no question about the fact that the
variance is material and this was called to the attention of the plaintiff
in the trial court during the trial. It is established and a well settled
doctrine that the allegations in a pleading and proof must correspond,
and this has been passed on in many cases by this Court, and in
Michie's Digest Vol. 9, page 829, the substance of the holdings in
many cases there referred to is stated as follows:
"It is a firmly established principle, applicable both to
courts of law and courts of equity, and to both civil and
criminal cases that the allegata and probata nmst corre-
spond.
VI
Error in refusing to strike out the evidence of Miss Eavers, and the
blank affidavit filed with her evidence. (See Certificate No. 1,
R. 262.)
Defendant moved to strike out the testimony of Miss Eavers,
particularly that portion of her testimony with reference to a con-
versation testified to by her as having been had between her and Mrs.
Bishop and an unknown person, it being a part of the said conversa-
tion that an offer of a sum of money was made to her if she would
execute the affidavit, the baik form of which appears in the record,
as plaintiff's exhibit 7, R. 131. It does not appear that the parties
were acting for petitioner and the transaction referred to is a trans-
action had between third persons. It does not appear that Mrs. Bishop
was acting for petitioner or had any authority to act for it in con-
nection with the said matter, and it appears from the record that
petitioner had withdravn altogether long prior to the occurrence
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testified to by Mrs. Eavers and the testimony is plainly hearsay and
irrevelent. It is sought to bind petitioner by the acts and talk
14*' of unauthorized parties. *It is not shown by whom the affidavit
was prepared or at whose instance it was presented to the
witness. Her testimony relates to a transaction between a third party
and not in the presence of petitioner or anyone authorized to act for it.
The contract sued on here was not referred to. The alleged affidavit
was not in rebuttal to any testimoncv that had been offered by
petitioner and relates in no way to the instant suit. It does not appear
that Miss Eavers knew anything about the alleged agreement between
the plaintiff and petitioner. If the affidavit had been executed, it could
not have been used or admitted in evidence in the instant case, or an,
one of the other pending cases. Her testimony related in no way to
the instant case, was foreign to it, hearsay and irrevelent and should
have been strickened out.
VII
Error in refusing to strike out all of the plaintiff's evidence. (See
certificate No. 1, page 259.)
In the discussion of this ground of error, we will quote freely
from the testimony of witnesses for plaintiff, and it is important and
will be convenient for the Court to have the contract sued on and the
averments directly relating to the contract sued on for easy and con-
venient reference, and especially as the petition as shown in the record
is very dim typewriting, and we therefore quote as follows from the
petition, R. pages d to e, inclusive.
"That for sometime prior to January 1st, 1935, you,
the said Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, being
engaged in organizing into an association all persons em-
ployed in the clothing industry, particularly in the rnanufac-
turing branch thereof, did, during the months of January
and February, 1935, attempt to organize and obtain as
members of your said organization, all persons employed
bv L. Grief Brothers, in their plants located in Staunton,
Virginia; and as in inducement to the said employees, of
which the undersigned was one, and in consideration of
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15* their becoming members of the said organization *you the
said Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, did then
and there promise the said employees, and particularly the
undersigned, that should any of them lose their employment
at the said plants of L. Grief Brothers by reason of joining
the said labor organization, that you, the said Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, would pay the said employee
the salary that the said employee was earning at the time,
and would continue to pay the same until the said employee
should obtain other employment, or until such other employ-
ment was provided by you, for said employee. In considera-
tion of the said promise and undertaking, the undersigned
did join and become a member of your said organization,
and upon so doing, to-wit: on the 5th day of March, 1935,
the undersigned lost her employment at the said plants of
L. Grief Brothers for the reason that the undersigned had
joined and become a member of the said labor organization.
That the undersigned at the time of her loss of employment
was earning and being paid by the said Grief Brothers the
sum of $18.00 per week, and that upon her said loss of em-
ployment, and by reason of your said promise, you, the
said Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, became
then and there obligated to pay to the undersigned the sum
of $18.00 per week until the undersigned obtained other
employment, or such other employment was provided by
you, for the said plaintiff, which said employment though
due effort has been made and due diligence exercised, has
not up to this time been obtained by the undersigned, nor
has the same been provided by you. That notwithstanding
your said obligation as aforesaid to pay to the undersigned
the sum of $18.00 per week as hereinbefore set out, you,
the said Amalgamated Clothing \Vorkers of America, only
paid to the undersigned the sum of $5.00 per week for the
period beginning March 5, 1935, to September 1, 1935, and
the sum of $7.50 per week from that date to January 18,
1935, 1936, to-wit: a period of fourty-six weeks; and that
on the said 18th day of January, 1936, you, the said Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America, informed the under-
signed that vou would no longer pay the sums required of
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you as hereinbefore set out, thereby completely repudiating
your said promise and understaking to the damage of the
undersigned the sum of $3500.00."
16* *The witnesses relied on by plaintiff to prove her case are
John Caldwell (R. 2), Rena Demastus (R. 13), H. H. Lohr
(R. 31), J. W. Childress (R. 42), Mrs. H. H. Lohr (R. 48), Mrs.
J. W. Childress (R. 57), Mrs. John Caldwell (R. 67), and Mrs. Kitty
Arehart (R. 73), and plaintiff's testimony (R. 80).
The testimony of each of these witnesses has been referred to
and discussed supra on motions to strike out.
But assuming for mere argument that the testimony of each of
these witnesses is relevant and pertinent, we submit that their testi-
mony does not prove the plaintiff's case as stated by her; and in
considering whether this testimony proves the contract sued on the
substance of the testimony of each of these witnesses referring in
any way to the agreement sued on, directly or indirectly, will be
quoted.
1. Mr. Caldwell testified only to what he heard of a conversa-
tion between Miss Corlett and Mrs. Demastus (R. 9), and he said
that he heard Mrs. Corlett say to Mrs. Demastus, "Don't worry about
losing your job. In case you lose your job, the Union will pay you as
much as you are making right now; we have lots of money." and on
cross examination he was asked (R. 12), "You did not hear any-
thing about anyone paying them (workers who might lose their jobs)
except Grief Brothers?" And he answered "No, sir." The extract
quoted above from Caldwell testimony is all that he learned by hearing
the conversation between Miss Corlett and Mrs. Rena Demastus.
2. When Mrs. Rena Demastus showed concern about losing
her job, (R. 14-15), Miss Corlett said "You will not lose your job,
because if you lose your job, we will put you back in the shop, and
pay you every dollar that you lose while out, and will pay you your
salary until put back in the shop. (Note: This ans'wer of Mrs. DC-
mastus 7cas objected to on the grounds of material 7,aria;ce from the
contract sued on (R. 15).) Mrs. Demastus was plaintiff's second
witness and plaintiff cannot claim that she did not have timely notice
of petitioner's claim of variance, and objection and exception was
made to the same kind of testimony throughout the trial,
17" *under stipulation made on approval of the Court (R. 16),
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and the Trial Court fully appreciated this, and when attorney
for petitioner said (R. 32) "We have an objection to every question
being propounded to each of these witnesses on this subject and a
motion to exclude their testimony," and the Court said (R. 32) "That
is right. In the record those objections can be inserted, and the
grounds for same just as if made after each question and answer."
Mrs. Demastus was asked (R. 17)
Q What, if anything did she, (Miss Christenson) say
as to how long these payments were to continue?
A Until they put us back into the shop, and here I
as right now. And she said at that time "there was nothing
said about getting us a job elsewhere or sending us away
anywhere else, or looking for another job; and the time
she brought up about other jobs we was put out and after
the N. R. A. went out."
Mrs. Demastus said after the N. R. A. was decided unconstitu-
tional, that was when she (Miss Christenson) told us that we could
look for other jobs, and that was long after she had lost her job.
3. H. H. Lohr said that Miss Christenson said (R. 32-33) "She
knew the girls were scared to join the Union-scared to lose their
jobs. She said that she would pay them anything they lost; she would
pay it back; the Amalgamated will pay her the loss until put back in
the factory. Mr. Lohr said that Mr. Strebel said in a speach (R. 35)
after the girls were put out of the factory, that "they would not have
anything to worry about, the Amalgamated will pay them for all the
time they are off."
4. J. W. Childress said (R. 42-43-44) that she, (Miss Chris-
tenson) "wanted my wife to join the Union, and told of the advantage
of joining it, and he said that he did not think much of it, and Miss
Christenson said (R. 45) "If your wife loses her job-her organiza-
tion-and she named it, would pay her until either put back in Grief.
\Ve are going to put her back up there, do not worry about that, pay
her until she is put back to work."
18* *5. Mrs. H. H. Lohr said (R. 49) that Miss Christenson
told her what the Union was and said that if I should lose my
job by joining, your Union, then what? She said "Just do not worry
about that, we will take care of you; we will pay you just what you
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made at that plant if you lose your job, and will put you back in
the shop."
6. Mrs. J. W. Childress said (R. 59) that she told her (Miss
Christenson) that she was afraid of losing her job and Miss Chris-
tenson said "not to fear; we had everything to gain and nothing to
lose. We would get what we were making, the average of the past six
weeks wages if we lost our jobs; we would get everything."
7. Mrs. John Caldwell said that Miss Corlett said to Mrs.
Demastus "You have nothing in the world to lose; if you lose your
job as the result of this, however, we will pay you what you are
making until we put you back to work." and Mrs. Caldwell further
said "That after the shut out, that Miss Christenson approved of
what Corlett had said to Mrs. Demastus in a conversation with Mrs.
Caldwell at Buffalo Gap, but this was long after the agreement as
sued on was made."
8. Mrs. Kitty Arehart said (R. 74), that Miss Christenson said
to her "if they throw you out, and you do not sign a card, we cannot
do anything for you, we cannot put you back, or pay you what you are
making in the shop either." She said "That if I went on and signed
the card, they could put me back in the shop and pay me what I was
making, that is the Union."
Mrs. Kiser said (R. 81), She, Miss Christenson told us, word
for word, as the others told you. Ve would get our pay iin case we
lost our jobs. We had told her that it would be hard to organize here.
She said that we would get paid for the time we lost, in case we lost
our jobs.
It can hardly be claimed with any pretension of fairness that
the testimony of the said witnesses for the plaintiff proves the contract
sued on. If such testimonv is held to be competent, it certainly does
19* not prove the contract stied on *but proves a materially differ-
ent contract than the contract sue'd on.
Mrs. Kiser was asked (R. 81) "Did she, Miss Christenson, say
how long they would pay you ?" and Mrs. Kiser answered, "Until we
are put to work, or until they got us a good job, that was equally as
good, and pay us for all the time that we lost. She said if your part-
ner makes $3.80 today, you are due $3.80. When asked on cross-
examination (R. 84), "What was the agreement that Miss Christen-
son made with you, and she answered, "She just told us she would
pay us for the time that we lose; if we are put out of the shop up
here, we would be paid our wages, and she said paid by the union,
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(R. 84), and it appears from the plaintiff's testimony, (R. 85) that
this alleged agreement with Miss Christenson was made when the
plaintiff's sister was talking about losing her job, and Miss Christen-
son said "You got nothing to worry about, if 7our partner today
makes $3.80 you will get that much. That was after we was put out.
She said if your partner makes that per day, vou will get that, and
when the plaintiff was asked (R. 86) "How long this was after she
had lost her job, she said about two or three days, after being excluded
from the plant and during the same week, and it appears from the
plaintiff's testimony that the alleged promises that Miss Christenson
made were mot made when the alleged contract sued on was made,
but really made after the plaintiff had lost her job, and we submit
that the evidence for the plaintiff in this case cannot be patched
together so as to specifically and clearly prove the oral contract
sued on.
Petitioner, when she applied for membership in the Union pre-
sumedly had notice of the written Constitution of the Union, and in
all matters between her and the Union, the Constitution applied, and
any oral agreement that she had was merged into the Constitution and
could not be varied by parol.
A printed copy of the Constitution of petitioner was filed with its
answer (R. page j), and was proven and offered in evidence and is
copied in the record (R. 157 seq).
20;- *As stated supra, petitioner is a voluntary labor union,
and its existence and entire plan of its existence is embodied in
its Constitution, which is its fundamental and controlling law, and
is the written agreement between all the members of the Union and by
which each member, and applicant for membership is bound, in every
matter arising between such member and applicant for membership.
And each of such persons, as this court has announced, in the case of
International Brotherhood, etc., vs. Wood, 162 Va. 517, is con-
clusively presumed to have notice of the provisions of the Constitution.
The language of the Court in the \Vood case is here pertinent and
we quote as follows from that case 162 Va. 552 and numerous cases
are there cited in support,
"A person applying for membership in a fraternal
benefit association is charged with the duty of acquainting
himself with its constitution and by-laws; and in the absence
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of fraud is conclusively presumed to know the qualifications
for membership therein prescribed and the limitations there-
by imposed upon the power and authority of its officers, and
upon its subordinate lodges, their officers as its agents. The
same rule, of course, applies to persons who have become
members .... "
After said quotation, numberous authorities are recited and relied
on, and it seems to appear that the same law applies alike to beneficial
associations and to labor unions (see Wrighton Unincorporated Asso-
ciations and Business Trusts, pages 5 and 285 et seq).
This doctrine of the Wood case appears not to be confined to
this Court but is recognized in other jurisdictions. (Oakes Organized
Labor and Industrial Conflicts, page 23) (Long, et al vs. B. & 0.
R. R. Co., 155 Maryland 265) ; and seems to be founded on reason
and common sense.
And can there be any doubt about the )rinciples laid down in
the authorities supra being applicable to the instant case, and is it not
therefore conclusively presumed that the plaintiff when she applied
for membership in the union had notice of the provisions of its Consti-
tution. And if this is correct, she would be bound by the Con-
21' stitution, in any dealings that she had with the Union. *And
upon reading the Constitution, is it not apparent that the Union
has no authority, either expressly or impliedly to make such promise
as sued on here.
Petitioner in its answer (R. page k), denies that it made any such
agreement as sued on, and denies that anyone had authority to make
such agreement for it. We contend that petitioner itself did not have
authority to make such agreement and we submit that the case of
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Barnhill 214 Ala. 565, 108 So.
and 47 A. L. R. 270 is in point and closely resembles the instant case,
"There the plaintiff claimed that strike benefits were
promised him by the Union if she should remain on strike.
The payments continued for a period of time. The defend-
ant union then discontinued the strike, and the payments to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted an action. The decision
of the Court, stripped of all of its verbal foliage, held simply
that the Constitution of the defendant was the only contract
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and the supreme governing law. As the Constitution did
not provide for such payments, the plaintiff was denied a
recovery."
But if petitioner did not have authority to make the contract, its
agent certainly would not have either expressed or implied authority
to make it. It is said in 2 C. J. page 578,
"An agent has no implied authority to do what the
principal himself is not authorized to do.''
Here, it is claimed that the alleged agreement was made with one
of the Union organizers. That being true, the burden was and is on
the plaintiff to prove the authority by a preponderance of the evidence
and according fo our contention, this burden must be satisfied before
the Court can consider the evidence as to the alleged promise (see
Humphreys vs. Republican Central Campaign Committee, et al,
(supra) 320 Penna. 353). And we submit has not proven the author-
itv of any agent to make such promise for the Union.
On principle, it is to us unreasonable and unthinkable that a labor
union would make such an agreement as sued on. It is in fact common
knowledge that labor unions have no such authority. The making of
such agreement as sued on would necessarily be the ruin of any
Union.
22* At the time of the making of the alleged agreement *the
N. R. A. Act was in force and there was active operation under
it; and the agreement that was really made was that if a worker of
the Grief Brothers was discharged for joining the Union, that then
under the terms of the Act, such worker could be restored to his job
and receive back pay for the time that he lost, by being discharged,
and this was construed by the plaintiff into the fictitious contract sued
on. Who ever heard, in fact of a labor Union paving the wages of a
discharged worker.
The Trial Court appeared to have been of the opinion that the
relief payment made from March 5th to January 18, 1936, had a far
reaching effect in making out and proving the plaintiff's case, over-
looking, as we take it, entirely, that there can be no ratification by
the principle without full knowledge and notice of all the material
facts and surroundings.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers vs. Mrs. D. A. Kiser
Corrigan vs. Bobbs Merrill Co. 288 N. Y. 58.
Gen ral Paint Corporation, et al vs. Kramer 57 Fed.
Second 698 (C. C. A. Oklahoma.)
The plaintiff, however, had the burden of proving that petitioner
had full knowledge of the facts and circumstances and surroundings.
Hcnshaw etc. vs. (;lobe & Rutgcrs Fire hIs. Co., 112
NV. Va. 556.
And it can hardly be claimed that this can be done. Especially
as this agreement is supposed to have -been made by an agent, it was
absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to prove that petitioner had full
knowledge of the contents of the alleged agreement and all the material
facts and circumstances and surroundings, and without this, there
could certainly be no ratification.
In Ohio Boulevard Land Corporation vs. Gregory, 46 Fed. Snd
263 (C. C. A. Michigan) the Court stated:
"Ratification of an unauthorized act can only be with
full knowledge of all material facts.."
It is confidently submitted that the plaintiff did not make out her
case by the evidence and that all of her evidence should have been
strickened out by the Trial Court, and it is an admitted fact that the
plaintiff did not pro\,e the provision in the oral contract that she was
to become a member of the Union, and the Court instructed the jury
that that was an immaterial fact.
23* *VIII
RRORS OF THE ('CURT IN (;IVING AND REFUSING
INSTRUCTIONS
When both sides in this case had rested, attorneys for the plaintiff
and for petitioner respectiv\ely offered numerous instructions.-More
instructions probably than it is generally practicable to offer. Plain-
tiff's instructions were numbered by letters of the alphabet and pe-
titioner's instructions by numerials. The instructions given for the
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plaintiff are A, B, C, E, F, H. I. and J and the instructions given at
the request of petitioner are 1, 2, 7, 15, 25, 28, 29, 30, 42.
Each of the instructions given for the plaintiff were objected to,
and when given, exception was noted, but we will only briefly discuss
exceptions relating to particular instructions without waiving our
exceptions.
As to instruction "A" (R. 311%) we have nothing to say. Inl-
struction "B" was objected to upon the grounds as stated under the
instruction (R. 312). There was no material evidence in the case
upon which to found this instruction. There is no evidence in the case
that shows that petitioner could have called a witness to show a
material fact in the case, and did not do so. The person evidently
referred to was Miss Bishop, a sister-in-law of the plaintiff, Mrs.
Kiser. Miss Bishop had been summoned by both sides and she was
thought to be an adverse witness by her relationship to plaintiff and
the document referred to was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
Instruction "C" (R. 313), will not be discussed at present, but
the exception thereto is not waived, on the grounds stated. Instruc-
tion "E" (R. 314), the grounds of the objection to this instruction
are stated on page (R. 315). There is no evidence in the case that
shows that the contract sued on was made through the duly authorized
agent and representative of petitioner. And the instruction was and is
based ol an agreement other than that laid in the plaintiff's pleading
and bill of particular.
Instruction "F" (1R. 316) will not be discussed at present and
the objections made to it, and exceptions thereto relied on.
24* *Instruction "H" ( R. 318) is absolutely inconsistent and
in conflict with Instruction "'2" (R. 321) given for petitioner.
Instruction "2" states "that the terms of the contract sued on must
be clearly and expressly proven by the plaintiff, as set out in the
l)etition, and if she failed to prove this specific contract sued on, then
she is not entitled to recover anything in this case." The whole con-
sideration for petitioner's agreement as laid in the pleadings was that
petitioner was to become a member of the Union and the testimony
offered tended to prove an entirely different agreement, that is that
the consideration, the controlling consideration, for petitioner's agree-
ment was that the plaintiff should apply for membership in the union
an entirely different and material matter.
The trial Court rightly told the jury in Instruction "2" for
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petitioner that the contract as sued on mst he )roven, that is that
every provision must be proven, to entitle the plaintiff to recover.
Petitioner contends and insists that Instruction "H' was plainly
wrong, the trial court in its opinion, however, seemed to think there
was no conflict or inconsistence in Instruction "H" and "2," but it
is obvious when reading Instruction "H" that it is founded on an
agreement not mentioned in the pleading, not sued on, and an entirely
different agreement from the one in this case, as stated in petition.
Instruction "H" plainly contradicts Instruction "2." It is said
in 5 Michie's Digest, page 874, where many cases are cited, "\Vhen
conflicting or contradictorv instructions on a material point in a case
have been given, the verdict of the jury should he set aside, as it can
not be said whether the jury were controlled bv the one or by the
other."
It is well settled in this State that where instructions are incon-
sistent with or contradict each other, it is impossible to say by which
the jury was controlled. Richmond ctc. Powcr Co. v. Stcgcr 101 Va.
319 and this same principle has been laid down in numerous cases in
this court, not necessary to he cited. This instruction "I" (R. 319)
leaves out of consideration the material and controlling l)rinciple,
that the relief payments must have been made with the full
25* *knowledge of the contract and all surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances, and this certainly did not appear from the evidence
and the instruction overlooks the material fact that the alleged
organizor was and is not shown to have been the agent of petitioner
with authority to make the alleged contract.
This instruction ("J" (R. 319 , ) is plainly misleading and
erroneous in that it declares that the Constitution of the Union can
only be considered for the purpose of determining whether the de-
fendant's organizor, Miss Christenson actually made with the plaintiff
the agreement sued on. This was obviously wrong, the Constitution
could not he considered as giving the organizor authority to make
the agreement and could only be considered to show that she did
not have such authority and then follows a most remarkable p)rovision;
but the court further tells the jury that even though they may believe
that Miss Christenson was not authorized by the Constitution of the
defendant, Union, to make such an agreement, vet if she did in fact
make it, the defendant is bound bv it.
It must be plain to any body or anyone learned in the law, especi-
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ally, that if Miss Christenson had no authority under the Constitution
to make this agreement, that she could not be assumed to have such
authority because she actually made such contract. This provision is
absolutely inconsistent, unreasonable and contrary to the law of the
land. And it is plain if Miss Christenson made an agreement that she
had no authority to make, that the Union would not be bound unless
her unlawful act was ratified by the Union.
Instructions 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 were
offered by petitioner and rejected, and exception was noted as to the
rejection of each instruction offered (R. 331 et seq).
Of the rejected instructions, ten of them were, as we believe,
good law and applicable to this case, and should have been given,
namely 4, (R. 332); 6, (R. 334) ; 9, (R. 336) ; 11 (R. 338) ; 12 (R.
339); 32 (R. 355); 35 (R. 358); 37 (R. 359); and 38 (R. 361);
41 (R. 363), and we submit that it is so obvious that these rejected
instructions, specially referred to should have been given under
26* the facts of this case. *The other rejected instructions, though
each were excepted to, we will not discuss or especially refer
to, but we do not waive exception to any, one of these rejected instruc-
tions. We believe, however, more instructions were offered than should
have been tendered.
NOTE: Major Brower, who is Assistant Attorney General for
the United States for New York, is the senior leading counsel in this
case, and he is the member of a leading law firm in New York that has
had unusually wide experience in labor union cases. Major Brower,
however, on account of illness, has not been able to give this case any
attention since the trial before the jury ended on the 28th day of
May, 1938. The argument for motion for new trial was had on the
1st day of June, 1938, and everything since the end of the Jury trial,
May' 28, 1938, has been done by associate Counsel, and he wants it
understood that none of the exceptions appearing to have been made
in the record are waived but each one is relied on, although not
specially referred to or discussed in this petition.
Ix
ERROR OF THE COURT IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE
VERDICT OF THE JURY (R. 373)
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rror of the Court in refusing to set aside the verdict of the
jury (R. 373) and the grounds of the motion appear (R. 373 and
374). Motion on these grounds was argued at length, and the motion
was overruled and exception noted, (R. 379) and the trial court as
we have referred to supra, delivered an opinion in overruling the
motion, appearing in the record ( R. 374 to 379 inclusive).
It will be observed as we have referred to supra that the court
held that petitioner tried the case on a theory utterly at variance with
principles laid down by this Court when this case was before thi
Court on demurrer, and the question decided by this court that alone
concerned us in this trial was the question as to whether or not the
contract sued on could be proven. This court held that the contract as
stated, if proved as laid, is a valid and binding contract, and
27* the case was sent back for trial to ascertain whether or -*not
his contract, laid in the plaintiff's pleading, binds petitioner.
The foundation and basis of the contract, as we have pointed out,
and as appears from the pleading, was and is that the plaintiff should
become a member of the Union, but this case was tried when sent
back by the plaintiff on an entirely different contract, as we have
pointed out supra and at every stage of the trial, and overruling the
motion for a new trial, the trial court sustained the view of the plain-
tiff that the proving of an entirely different contract was not a material
variance, and on this alone we urged with great earnestness, that our
motion be sustained, and the trial court held that our position and con-
tention that the case had been tried not on the case alleged but on a
different case, was and is without merit.
The answer of petitioner appears in the record (R. i to page n
inclusive) and sets out carefully and painstakingly our defenses to
the plaintiff's petition, and it will be observed that before answering
the petition, we asked for a bill of particulars, which was ordered and
given and if the plaintiff relied on a different contract or agreement
from the one stated in the petition, it had an opportunity to state and
set it out, that it did not rely on the contract stated specifically but on
the contract that it has undertaken to prove in the trial of this case.
But she did not do this, but stated that she was going to prove at the
trial the case laid in the petition and proceeded in the bill of particu-
lars to set out the agreement that she expected to prove; and can it
be held that the case could be tried on entirely a different case, and
that the plaintiff would be permitted to prove or try to prove an
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entirely different agreement than the agreement stated in the petition
and bill of particulars? and we submit that the case upon which the
verdict was founded is not the case or the contract upon which the
suit was laid and based, but on a materially different contract, and
upon this ground of variance, we laid great stress in presenting our
motion and the ruling of the trial court on this question alone was,
as we believe, obviously error.
It is stated in the opinion of the trial court (R. 375) that
28* petitioner's attorney in his argument, frankly stated *that the
conflict as to the facts was settled by the verdict of the juryN.
That admission, however, was merely made as to where there is an
admitted conflict of evidence, but on motion and throughout the case,
it was urged that the plaintiff's evidence was irrelevant and did not
make out the case sued on and the testimony that we introduced was
directly in point and sustained and tended to sustain each and everY
defense set out in our answer, and our contention was and is there
was in fact no controlling evidence of the plaintiff for our evidence
to conflict with. But assuming that the plaintiff's evidence was rel-
ex-ant and in proof of the contract sued ol it will be seen by a careful
reading of the testimony of petitioner's witnesses, that the finding of
the jury was plainly wrong, and as referred to supra, it is unreason-
able and unthinkable that petitioner would have made such agreement
as the plaintiff sought to prove, and an agreement such as there was
no authority for making under petitioner's constitution.
The principal witnesses called in support of petitioner's defense
were Miss Christenson, (R. 179 et seq), Marie Eutsler (R. 216) et
seq), Annabelle Masincup (R. 221 ct scq), Mrs. L. Masincup (R.
235 ct scq), Gertrude Bartley, (R. 233 et seq), Iris Austin (R. 239 et
scq), and Glenna Clemmner (R. 245 ct seq), and it will be seen by
reading the testimony of these respective witnesses, that each is very
intelligent, and their testimonv establishes, overwhelmingly, that no
such agreement as sued on here was made by petitioner, and the verdict
on the evidence we submit was clearly wrong.
Miss Fdith Christenson was the Union's organizer here. She,
as her testimony shows, is an unusually intelligent and educated
woman and of wide experience in the affairs of the world, and that
she was a wvoman of unusual merit and intelligence, is shown by the
fact that she was an assistant instructor on economics at the celebrated
Women's College of Bryn Mawr (R. 180). Miss Christenson denied
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that she made any such agreement as sued on or as claimed by the
plaintiff and her testimony is so consistent, so reasonable and clear
that it cannot be questioned.
20* The N. R.. . was in force when Miss Christenson *came
to Staunton to try to organize the workers at Grief Bros., and
the representatiions that she made were such as were warranted
under that Act, that if any worker lost her job, because of joining or
sylmpathizing with a labor union, that she could be re-instated and
paid for her lost time. Miss Christenson in her testimony was asked
on cross examination (R. 205) "They are all mistaken when they say
that you at any time offered them, as an inducement to join the union,
the promise, if they lost their job, in consequence, you would pay
them their wages, until von reinstated them or got them other employ-
ment ?" and she answered, "I deny that." "I do not blame the girls;
I think they have been lead to believe what I said about the law re-
ferred to the Union. These workers have been lead to believe that it
was the Union and not the employer who was presumed to pay them
the back pay." She was then asked on Cross Examination, "I under-
stand you to say that vou did not, at any time, make the statement
that they need not concern themselves; that if they did lost their jobs,
the Union would take care of them by paying their wages until it
re-instated them?" Answer, "I never made that statement." Q. You
never made any statement that could be misconstrued that way. A.
Except that statement I made just now. Q. Your statement is that the
only promise that you made was that the Amalgamated would take
such steps as it could to complete their reinstatement by Grief Bros. ?
A. Yes, sir. (R. 206) Q. And that the money that they were paid
was not paid in pursuance of such promise, but merely as a guarantee
or relief, merely voluntary guaranty? A. Yes, sir. Q. That is the
position of the Union here and your position ? A. That is my position.
Miss Christenson was fully sustained by the other witnesses called
in behalf of petitioner.
There is no doubt of the fact that on the motion for a new trial,
we urged each of the grounds set out in Certificate 5, (R. 373), and
we here insist that the verdict in this case is contrary to the evidence
and without evidence to support it, and founded on a case not pre-
sented by the pleading and bill of particulars. In our motion to set
aside the verdict, it would appear from the opinion of the trial
30* Court (R. 375) *that in our motion to set aside the verdict,
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we relied chiefly ol conflict between Instruction "2" for defend-
ant and Instruction "H" for the plaintiff, but as a matter of fact we
objected to the verdict upon every ground stated in the certificate, and
that the jury was mislead by instructions given for the plaintiff that
have been referred to supra.
It was urged with great earnestness that there was gross error
of the trial court in giving for the plaintiff, instruction "H" directly
in conflict with Instruction "2" for the defendant, and that it could
not be determined whether the jury was guided by the erroneous in-
struction in arriving at its conclusion. Instruction "H" appears in
the record, page 318, and Instruction "2" appears at R. 321.
The Court in instruction "2" referred specifically to the oral con-
tract sued on, and provided that it must be proved clearly and expressly
as set out in the plaintiff's petition, and if the plaintiff failed in so
proving, that she was not entitled to recover. One of the controlling
terms of the contract was and is that the plaintiff was to become a
mnember of the Union. The oral contract is a whole contract, and the
whole had to be proven, and the failure to prove any part of it was
necessarih fatal to the plaintiff. This is obvious to anyone who
knows anything about law. The Court nevertheless by instruction
"H" told the jury in effect that it was not necessary to prove the
contract as laid in the petition, but that it wa sufficient to prove the
alleged contract as shown by the evidence, that is a different contract,
and by instruction "H" the Court said "The Court instructs the Jury
the question as to whether the plaintiff merely agreed to join the
defendant's union, or actually became a member of the same, is wholly
immaterial in this case." (R. 318.) There can be no doubt about the
fact under the law that the plaintiff was bound to prove by pre-
ponderance of the evidence, the oral contract sued on, just as laid in
the pleading and bill of particulars, and that if she failed to do this,
that her case failed, and yet the Court, after directing the oral contract
be proven, as stated in Instruction "2," told the Jury that it was
31 not necessary to do so, but only necessary to prove *the con-
tract claimed by the plaintiff in her evidence, and it was wholly
immaterial whether she proved her case as laid or not, and it can
hardly be contended by any fairminded person, that these instructions
were not inconsistent and in conflict, and necessarily misleading and
grounds to set aside the verdict.
For the errors set out in the above petition, and for other errors
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that may he hereafter found, your petitioner prays that a writ of error
may be granted, and this case may he heard and reversed, and a new
trial granted.
Respectfully submitted,




CHARLES CURRY, Attorneys for Petitioner.
1, Charles Curry, a lawyer practicing in the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia, have carefully read the ahove petition and in
my opinion believe that the verdict and judgment complained of ought
to be reheard by the Supreme Court and the verdict and judgment
set aside and a new trial granted. Given under by hand this 30th day
of September, 1938.
CHARLES CURRY.
Copy of this petition delivered to me September 30, 1938, at
3:30 p. m.
JOSEPH I. NACHMAN,
Atty. for Mrs. D. A. Kiser.
October 11, 1938. Writ of error awarded by the Court. Bond
$300.00.
M. B. W.
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